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Abstract
This paper investigates whether the low foreign direct investment in Ice-
land can be explained by its geographical location together with market size
measures. The eﬀects of these factors on inward FDI are analyzed by means
o ft h eg r a v i t ym o d e l . T h em o d e li sa l s oapplied to analyze sector, trade bloc
and country speciﬁce ﬀects. The research is based on panel data, running
over countries, sectors and years. Results indicate that distance negatively
aﬀects FDI and that FDI appears to be more driven by wealth eﬀects than
market size eﬀects.
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) has received increased attention in recent years.
In some recent literature economists have been analyzing the driving forces of FDI,
and why FDI tends to take place between wealthy countries, rather than ﬂowing
from the rich to the poor countries (Markusen, 2002).
One of the interesting features of inbound Icelandic FDI is that until fairly
recently, there was none. As with the small level of exports, this might be due to
the small market size of Iceland and its location. Gravity models of trade leads us
t ob e l i e v et h a tt h i si sb e c a u s eo fm a r k e ts i z ea n dd i s t a n c e . T h e r e f o r e ,i nt h i sp a p e r
I choose to test this by using the gravity model of FDI which speciﬁcally accounts
for these eﬀects.
Gravity models have been increasingly popular in trade literature for analyzing
the driving forces of foreign direct investment. In an interesting paper, Brainard
(1997) applies a gravity model to multinational activities. Brainard analyses multi-
national enterprises (MNEs) and seeks to capture the trade-oﬀ between MNE aﬃli-
ate sales and trade. She applies data on MNEs in the U.S. and its trading countries.
In her paper, Brainard uses aﬃliate sales to proxy FDI rather than applying actual
FDI, which is a reasonable way to capture actual MNE activity, because it measures
the value of this activity.
Brainard estimates the incentive multinationals have for exporting rather than
undertaking FDI, when corrected for several factors such as trade and investment
costs as well as economies of scale. Brainard uses the share of exports in total sales
as her dependent variable, which is meant to be an inverse indicator for foreign
aﬃliate sales in total sales (that is FDI). She ﬁn d st h a tM N E sh a v em o r ei n c e n t i v e
to undertake overseas production (FDI) rather than exporting to the foreign market
as transport costs and trade barriers increase, and as investment barriers as well as
relative weight of plant to ﬁrm scale economics decrease.
Several other papers apply gravity models to FDI ﬂows and FDI stock data.
Jeon and Stone (1999) analyze FDI ﬂo w sw i t ha ne m p h a s i so nt h eA s i a - P a c i ﬁc
1region. They estimate sector and country ﬁxed eﬀects. They run separate regres-
sions for individual years in 1987-93 and ﬁnd that in most cases FDI is positively
aﬀected by home country GDP and negatively aﬀected by home country popula-
tion. However, their estimates indicate that for most years FDI is not impacted by
host country population or GDPs, nor distance. Jeon and Stone also use dummies
to account for the diﬀerence in investment made by various trade blocs. Di Mauro
(2000) provides an interesting study where she analysis two issues: Whether FDI in
the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) region can be regarded to be
substitute for exports from the European Union (EU), which would have a negative
impact on employment in the EU, and secondly whether FDI in the CEEC region
can be considered as replacing investment in regions such as Portugal and Spain.
Econometrically, the research by Di Mauro is interesting, since she disaggregates
FDI by both countries and sectors over time. The data dimensions are therefore
comparable to the ones used in this research, although diﬀerent questions are asked
here, using diﬀerent regressions.
An additional study on CEEC’s is the gravity model approach by Bevan and
Estrin (2000), where they analyze the determinants of foreign direct investment
ﬂows in transition economies.
In de Mello Sampayo (2000), a gravity model is applied to analyze determinants
of US originated FDI. Finally, an even more recent paper by Mody, Razin and
Sadka (2003), extends the gravity model to an information-based model of FDI
ﬂows.
More related to my data are the studies that have been carried out in order to
analyze the determinants of FDI in Iceland (e.g. Thorsteinsson, 1995; Sighvatsson,
1996; Gylfason, 2000; and Sigurdsson, 2001). However, none of these use the
gravity model approach.
2Figure 1. Balance of Payments and FDI.
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Figure 1 shows an overview of the balance of payments on the macro economic
level. Foreign direct investment falls within the category of liabilities, since it
represents the foreign ownership of controlling ﬁrm stock in a particular country.
When compared to foreign bank loans or foreign portfolio investment, FDI is gen-
3erally considered more stable, which is particularly important in volatile economic
environment (Grosse, 1997).
The analysis provided in the following sections seeks to investigate whether FDI
is driven by gravity model features such as market size and distance. This paper
also analyses ﬁxed source country eﬀects and sector speciﬁce ﬀects. The research is
based on unique data on FDI in Iceland, covering both source countries and sectors
of allocation over time. The data dimensions also allow for simultaneous estimates
for sectors and trade blocs.
I test the gravity model and ﬁnd that consistent with previous literature, dis-
tance seems to matter for FDI. Unlike earlier ﬁndings, wealth may be more impor-
tant than market size. Here population size and GDP size is believed to give an
indication of market size. If FDI increasing in market size then both population
and GDP could be expected to have positive signs. Both source and host country
GDP is always estimated to be positive. However, source and host country pop-
ulation is almost always estimated to be negative. If the signs of the market size
variables (GDP and population) are close to being equal and opposite (GDP per
capita), then it is possible to say that FDI is aﬀe c t e db yw e a l t he ﬀects, rather than
market size eﬀects.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of how FDI
has developed in Iceland. In Section 3 the foundations of the gravity model are
laid out. Section 4 lists the data used in these research, and Section 5 exhibits
regression results for the basic gravity model speciﬁcation. Section 6 provides
results for simultaneous analysis of sources and allocation of FDI, while Section 7
considers FDI allocation speciﬁcally. Section 8 provides results form running the
gravity model for FDI stock. Finally, Section 9 includes summary and conclusions.
42 Development of Foreign Direct Investment in
Iceland
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is often formed when multinationals expand their
operations from one country to another. Although foreign investors have been
increasingly interested in investing in Iceland, the inward FDI stock in Iceland has
been low compared to the other Nordic countries. As can be seen in Figure 2, in
Iceland FDI inﬂows were marginal until 1996 when a Swiss multinational started
investing in the aluminum sector.
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Source: The Central Bank of Iceland (2001).
Figure 2 shows the development of foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in
Iceland, with Iceland being the host country of investment. In Figure 2 FDI is
presented as the FDI stock at the end of period.1 The stock of FDI equals accumu-
lated FDI inﬂows. As Figure 2 exhibits, total FDI stock has grown substantially
from 1995 to 2000, or about four-fold.
1All stock values in the ﬁgures are the end of period values.
53T h e G r a v i t y M o d e l
3.1 Theoretical Foundations of the Model
Several authors have made a contributions to the foundations of the gravity model.
Valuable contribution to literature have been made by Anderson, Bergstrand and
Deardorﬀ. Anderson (1979) assumes product diﬀerentiation and Cobb-Douglas
preferences. Anderson puts forward the so-called Armington Assumption on the
basis that products are diﬀerentiated by the country of origin. However, tariﬀsa n d
transport costs are not accounted for in this gravity model speciﬁcation.
Later, Bergstrand (1985) presumes that the Armington assumption holds as
well as CES preferences. Bergstrand’s conclusion is that price and exchange rate
variation have signiﬁcant eﬀects on aggregate trade ﬂows. He also ﬁnds the gravity
equation is a reduced form of a partial subsystem of a general equilibrium model
with nationally diﬀerential products.
Deardorﬀ (1995) derives a gravity model in the framework of a Heckscher-Ohlin
model. Bergstrand presumes that the same preferences hold for all goods and thus
simpliﬁes the setup of Anderson (1979), who assumed this only for traded goods.
Deardorﬀ rejects the hypothesis that the Heckscher-Ohlin model is not a suﬃcient
framework for the gravity equation, and points out that empirical evidence for the
equation has been provided by those who complained about lack of theoretical basis
for the equation. Later, Deardorﬀ (1998) ﬁnds the gravity model to be consistent
with several variants of the Ricardian and Heckschser-Ohlin models.
3.2 The Model Speciﬁcation
The most commonly used version of the gravity model speciﬁed by Bergstrand






In the Bergstrand (1985) gravity model paper, Equation (1) explains the volume
of trade between countries i and j by their GDPs, distance and factors that either
6aid or restrict trade. The variable Xij,t accounts for export from country (i) to
country (j), at time (t). The variable Yi,t is the GDP of country (i) at time (t), Yj,t
is the GDP of country (j) at time (t) and Dij is the distance between the economic
centers of country (i) and country (j). The variable Aij accounts for factors that
either stimulate or reduce trade between country (i) and (j), and ﬁnally ζij,t is a
log-normally distributed error term, with E(ln(ζij,t))=0(Greene, 1997).
In this paper, like in the paper di Mauro (2000a, 2000b), the gravity model
p r e d i c t st h ev o l u m eo fF D Is t o c k . F D Ii se x p e c t e dt oi n c r e a s ew i t ha ni n c r e a s ei n
the GDPs of the host and source economies, but to decrease as distance increases.
The gravity model speciﬁcation used in this research can be presented as shown in
Equation (2). The dependent variable is now speciﬁed as inward FDI in Iceland,
varying over source countries, sectors and time. However, the variables represent-
ing the host country on the right hand side do not vary by country. Therefore
the host country notation is simpliﬁed as to only vary by time, not various host
countries. The (j) notation is therefore not needed, but only the (i) notation for








This basic equation speciﬁcation is presented in a logarithm format. The logarithms
are all natural logarithms. Therefore, the interaction between the variables in the
equation and the dependent variable is presented in percentages, i.e. how much
a percentage change in one of the variables aﬀects the dependent variable. The
explanatory variables in Equation (2) are somewhat identical to Equation (1), but
now Ni,t and Nt have been added to the basic equation as to account for the size
of the economies, where as the GDPs account for the economies’ total wealth.
Then in model speciﬁcations introduced later in this paper, dummies are added to
account for the source countries membership to trade blocs and the allocation of
FDI to several investment sectors. In similar papers for other countries, people have
tended to add dummies for a common borders between trading partner countries,
or an identical languages. However, this is not done here since Iceland does not
7share a border or language with any country.





Foreign Direct Investment transformed by
the Natural Logarithm Function, running




Foreign Direct Investment transformed
by the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine Function,
running over source countries (i) and sec-
tors (s), over time (t).
ln(Yt) Host Country GDP
Logarithm (ln) of Host country Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP), over time (t). +
ln(Yi,t) Source Country GDP
Logarithm (ln) of Source country (i) Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), over time (t). +
ln(Nt) Host Country Pop
Logarithm (ln) of Host country popula-
tion (Pop), over time (t). +
ln(Ni,t) Source Country Pop
Logarithm (ln) of Source country popula-
tion (Pop), over time (t). +
ln(Di) Distance
Logarithm (ln) of distance between the
source and the host country. —
Sector1 PowerIntensiveInd
Dummy variable accounting for the Power
Intensive Industries. +/—
Sector2 Comm. and Fin. Ind
Dummy variable accounting for the Com-
merce and Finance Industries. +/—
Sector3 Telecom& Transp.Ind
Dummy variable accounting for the Tele-
com and Transport Industries. +/—
Sector4 Other Industries
Dummy variable accounting for the Agri-
culture, Fishing and remaining Industries. +/—
Bloc1 EFTA
Dummy variable accounting for country
membership to the EFTA trade bloc. +/—
Bloc2 EU
Dummy variable accounting for country
membership to the EU trade bloc. +/—
Bloc3 NAFTA
Dummy variable accounting for country
membership to the NAFTA trade bloc. +/—
Bloc4 NON BlocMembers
Dummy variable accounting for country
non-membership to any trade bloc. +/—
All regressions presented here are obtained from using STATA version 7.0.
84 Data Sources and Statistics
Data on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) applied in this research were kindly pro-
vided by the Central Bank of Iceland. These data run over 4 investment sectors
and an 11 year period, from 1989 to 1999. The data account for annual data on
F D Iu n d e r t a k e ni nI c e l a n di nt h ee s t i m a t e dp e r i o d .
Table 2. Summary Statistics
Variable Units Obs Mean StD. Min Max
FDIi,s,t Million USD (1995 base) 748 3.155 13.887 -0.953 157.934
ln(FDI i,s,t) Natural Logarithm 240 0.366 2.514 -6.830 5.062
sinh
−1(FDI i,s,t) 748 0.559 1.165 -0.847 5.755
Yt Trillion USD (1995 base) 748 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.009
ln(Yt) Natural Logarithm 748 -4.934 0.083 -5.016 -4.765
Yi,t Trillion USD (1995 base) 740 1.219 1.957 0.014 8.582
ln(Yi,t) Natural Logarithm 740 -0.788 1.425 -4.289 2.149
Nt Million 748 0.265 0.008 0.253 0.278
ln(Nt) Natural Logarithm 748 -1.327 0.029 -1.376 -1.282
Ni,t Million 748 43.179 63.843 0.378 278.230
ln(Ni,t) Natural Logarithm 748 2.817 1.509 -0.974 5.628
Di Million 748 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.0167
ln(Di) Natural Logarithm 748 -5.827 0.571 -6.349 -4.098
Sectork Sectork ∈ {1,2,3,4} 748 0 1
Blocn Blocn ∈ {1,2,3,4} 748 0 1
Sources: Central Bank of Iceland, Bali-Online Webside, Economic Institute of Iceland, Inter-
national Labor Organization, World Bank, World Competitiveness Report, Kyoto Protocol.
The data cover the inward FDI stock in Iceland, obtained from 17 diﬀerent
source countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom and the United States. The number of observations could there-
fore be expected to be 17 times 4 times 11, equal to 748. However, the number of
9observations is 740 since data on Germany in 1989 and 1990 is not included in the
data, because these are the years before uniﬁcation of Germany.
The countries trade bloc membership is also included in the research. The
trade blocs included are Bloc 1 for the European Free Trade Association (EFTA),
Bloc 2 for the European Union, Bloc 3 is the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and ﬁnally Bloc 4 includes NON Bloc countries (non member countries).
Data on FDI are divided into four main investment sectors: Sector 1 represents
the Power Intensive Industries, Sector 2 Finance & Commerce Industries, and Sector
3 Telecom & Transport. Finally Sector 4 represents the Fishing Industry, the
Agricultural Industry, and remaining industries.
The original FDI data were obtained in Icelandic Krona, and then converted to
dollar values by using World Bank dollar exchange rates, and ﬁnally put on 1995
base using the World Bank GDP deﬂator. By doing so, the FDI values become
comparable to the variable values on the right hand of the equation, since values for
foreign GDP are obtained in USD 1995 values. GDP (Gross Domestic Product)
values used are deﬁned by the World Bank (2001) CD-Rom as ”constant 1995 US$”,
that is real values GDPs on a 1995 year base2. These are presented as trillion3
dollar values on a 1995 base. Finally, the FDI data used in the last column in
Table 8 are added up across sectors. Therefore, in those regressions the number of
observations is 185.
2The GDP World Bank deﬂator used is on a 1995 year base.
3Trillion is deﬁned in the US and Canada as 10^12, and in Britain, France and Germany as
million cubed or 10^18 (Hyper Dictionary, 2004).
105T h e B a s i c G r a v i t y M o d e l S p e c i ﬁcation
Here the error term relationship previously described in Equations (1) and (2), in
Section 3.2, can be presented in Equation (3) as follows, where the (ζ) is replaced
by (ε), so that: E(lnζi,s,t)=E(εi,s,t)=0 .
ln(FDIi,s,t)=β0 + β1 ln(Yt)+β2 ln(Yi,t)+β3 ln(Nt) (3)
+β4 ln(Ni,t)+β5 ln(Di)+εi,s,t
Ad i ﬀerent functional form of the gravity equation is shown in Equation (4), after
applying the so-called ”Inverse Hyperbolic Sine Function” to the dependent variable,
rather than applying the natural logarithm function4. The procedure is preferred
because of the need for transformation that does not truncate or eliminate low
values of the dependent variable. This way of imposing the inverse hyperbolic sine
(IHS) function to the dependent variable while imposing natural logarithm on the
dependent variables, has been used in studies on household wealth. The procedure
was proposed by Johnston (1949) and suggested as a suitable transformation for
household wealth data by Burbidge, Magee and Robb (1988), since some households
hold zero or negative net worth (Carroll, Dynan and Krane5, 1999). Figure 3
provides a graphical description of the natural logarithm function ln(x) (thick line)
and the inverse hyperbolic sine function6 sinh
−1(x) (thin line).
4A gravity equation in a natural logarithm format cannot operate on zero or negative values.
5In their 1999 paper, Carroll Dynan and Spencer make special thanks to Martin Browing at
the University of Copenhagen for suggesting this transformation, see page 4.
6More speciﬁc a l l y ,t h eI n v e r s eH y p e r b o l i cS i n eF u n c t i o nc a nb ep r e s e n t e da ssinh
−1(x)=
ln(x +( 1+xˆ2)ˆ0.5)
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Source: Author’s computations.
While other methods for dealing with zeros exist, they are all ad hoc in some
fashion, therefore this approach seems as reasonable as any.
The variable notation has been simpliﬁed as to better reﬂect the nature of the
data, since the data only covers one way investment7, not bilateral investment.
sinh
−1(FDIi,s,t)=β0 + β1 ln(Yt)+β2 ln(Yi,t)+β3 ln(Nt) (4)
+β4 ln(Ni,t)+β5 ln(Di)+εi,s,t
The regression results for Equation (4) are presented in Table 3. All the variables in
Table 3 are estimated to be signiﬁcant except for the domestic population variable.
7By this notation (i) refers to the source countries of investment, running from 1 to 17. By
doing so, the paper follows the notation applied in other thesis papers, this notation is well
presented in the CMM (2001) paper.
12Table 3. The Basic Model Speciﬁcation
Regressors ihs robust
ln(Yt) Host Country GDP 2.085∗∗
(2.23)
ln(Yi,t) Source Country GDP 1.143∗∗∗
(7.00)
ln(Nt) Host Country Population −2.975
(−1.14)








Degrees of Freedom 5
R-Squared 0.1028
Note: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below the coeﬃcients. ***,
** and * denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
One of the major questions asked in the beginning of this chapter is whether it is
possible to explain FDI in Iceland by distance, together with some other economic
variables represented in the gravity model.
Table 3 shows robust8 regression estimates for the gravity model based on Equa-
tion (4). The results indicate that the host and source countries GDPs are esti-
mated to be positively signiﬁcant.
Thus 1% increase in source GDP (equivalent to $12.19 billions9 at the sample
mean) implies an 1.143% increase in FDI, equivalent to $36,062 at the sample
means10. The fact that the GDPs are estimated to have positive signiﬁcant eﬀects
on FDI can be interpreted such that FDI increases with an increase in the economic
8All robust t-statistics are calculated using White’s (1980) heteroskedaticity correction. Note
that all of these t-statistics assume normality which need not be true in the data. Since the trade
literature typically ignores this diﬃculty, I do as well but note this potential problem.
9Here billion dollars are in American terms, so that $ 1 billion are equialent to $1,000,000,000.
10Sample means are listed in Table 2. Note that the means are very low, because of all the
zeros in the data.
13size of the host and source country, which is as theory would predict. Similarly,
theory would predict the population variables of both the host and source countries
to have positive eﬀects on FDI. This is however not the case, since both of these
variables are estimated to be negative, although only the source country population
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant.
The signiﬁcant negative estimate for the source country population indicates
that FDI is negatively driven by this measure of market size, indicating that
economies can be expected to invest more as their market size becomes smaller.
Taken together, it seems as FDI is positively aﬀected by countries total wealth but
negatively by their market size, which is somewhat as could be expected based
on the knowledge that a considerable investment is made by small economies like
Switzerland, and the EFTA member countries are generally small in population11.
Another way of interpreting the results for the host and source country sizes is to
consider their combination as per capita wealth eﬀects on investment. Thus the hy-
pothesis would be that GDP and population are equal and opposite in sign. When
considering the conﬁdence intervals for the two variables, both intervals overlap
one indicating an elasticity of one. This is because when the standard deviations
are considered, the source country GDP is found overlaps 1, whereas source pop-
ulation is found to overlap -112. Therefore, the coeﬃcient ratio is estimated to
overlap one13. This exercise gives a reason to believe that GDP per capita drives
FDI rather than the country total wealth. More speciﬁcally it indicates that it is
average wealth of country that matters, rather than total wealth.
F i n a l l y ,t h en e g a t i v ed i s t a n c ec o e ﬃcient obtained indicates that FDI decreases
in distance, more speciﬁcally FDI decreases as distance increases. In Table 3 I
choose to report both R squared and the log-likelihood values, as an indication
of the regression ﬁt. Since Table 3 includes the ﬁrst regression obtained in this
11In the power intensive industry.
12The standard deviation for source country GDP is 0.1633 and the coeﬃcient is estimated to
be 1.143, so the conﬁdence interval runs from 0.98 to 1.31. However, the standard dev. for source
country pop. is 0.1552, and coeﬃcient -0.976, resulting in conﬁdence interval between -1.13 and
-0.82.
13It would provide the same results if the coeﬃcients would overlap 4 and -4, etc.
14research, these measures on the R squared and the log-likelihood are for comparison
with latter tables, rather than telling a story on their own.
156 Allocation of Foreign Direct Investment
6.1 Decomposition by Sectors of Allocation
Next I want to look more closely at FDI allocation, and therefore disaggregate FDI
b ys e c t o r s . T h i sw i l lb ed o n en o ws i n c ei ta l l o w sa n a l y s i so fw h e t h e rF D Ii sd r i v e n
into individual sectors of allocation by the gravity model variables. I seek to gain
some information on sector allocation by measuring whether there is ﬁxed diﬀerence
between individual sectors. Equation (5) oﬀers a sectorial decomposition of FDI
by incorporating dummies for sectors.
sinh
−1(FDI i,s,t)=β0 + β1 ln(Yt)+β2 ln(Yi,t)+β3 ln(Nt) (5)
+β4 ln(Ni,t)+β5 ln(Di)+γkSectork + εi,s,t
The regression results for Equation (5) are presented in Table 4, the where
the variable coeﬃcient γk reﬂects on the sector speciﬁce ﬀects14.H e r e t h e 3 r d
sector Telecom & Transport (T&T) is held ﬁxed. When the estimates presented
in Table 4 are considered, distance is estimated to be equally as restrictive as in
the non-sector speciﬁc case in Table 3, indicating that it is not capturing sector
speciﬁc constants. As before, both domestic and foreign GDPs are estimated to
have signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on FDI, but source and host countries population
to negatively aﬀects FDI. Taken together these estimates indicate that investment
incentives are positively aﬀected by both host and source total wealth in that higher
per capita GDP increases FDI negatively aﬀected by market size (population). The
estimates obtained for the source country have higher signiﬁcance than those of the
host country, indicating that FDI is more impacted by source country market size
measures than those of the host country.
In Table 4 the third sector ”Telecom and Transport” (T&T) is held ﬁxed to avoid
the dummy variable trap. Estimates for sector one, two and four indicate that these
are all estimated to be signiﬁcantly positive from the T&T sector. Interestingly
14This is done to avoid the omitted variable bias.
16enough, the commerce and ﬁnance (C&F) sector is estimated to account for even
more FDI than the power intensive industries. However, these sector speciﬁc
estimates are obtained after correcting for economic sizes of the host and source as
well as distance, which may explain why C&F is higher than the power intensive
industry, when compared to telecom and transport. Also could potentially be
due to the small time series variation of the Icelandic variables, which impact the
research as a whole.
Table 4. Fixed Sector Eﬀects
Regressors ihs robust
ln(Yt) Host Country GDP 2.085∗∗
(2.29)
ln(Yi,t) Source Country GDP 1.143∗∗∗
(7.22)
ln(Nt) Host Country Population −2.975
(−1.17)






Sector2 Comm. and Fin. Ind. 0.649∗∗∗
(6.79)






Degrees of Freedom 8
R-Squared 0.1492
Note: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below the coeﬃcients. ***,
** and * denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
The regression results are based on a sample of data with 740 observations.
The log-likelihood values are presented here, since they can be used to compare
17diﬀerent speciﬁcations. By following the standard procedure for log-likelihoods15,
the diﬀerence between the two log-likelihood values is multiplied by 2 yielding a
value of 4.6. And since the value 4.6 is higher than the critical value 3.841 (based on
o fo n ed e g r e eo ff r e e d o m ) ,t h er e s t r i c t e dm odel version in Table 3 is not preferred16
to the unrestricted version in Table 4.
15”Let θ be a vector of parameters to be estimated, and let H0 specify some sort of restriction
on these parameters. Let b θU be the maximum likelihood estimate of θ obtained without regard
to constraints, and let b θR be the constrained maximum likelihood estimator.” Greene (1997, pp.
161).
”If the restriction c(θ)=0is valid, imposing it should not lead to a large reduction in the
log-liklelihood function. Therefore, we base the test on the diﬀerence, lnL−lnLR,w h e r eL is the
value of the likelihood function at the unconstraint value of θ and LR is the value of the likelihood
value function at the restricted estimate” Greene (1997, pp. 160).
16The objective is to determine whether the restricted version can be rejected when compared
to the non-restricted version. This is possible if the diﬀerence is high enough.
187 Sources of FDI
In order to analyze the country and trade bloc eﬀects on FDI, I next estimate
country and bloc speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.
7.1 Decomposition by Trade Bloc Membership
This subsection deals with the decomposition of FDI by trade blocs. The disag-
gregation by trade bloc membership is reﬂected in the variable in Equation (6).
The coeﬃcient πn accounts for speciﬁc trade bloc eﬀects, running from one to four,
bloc=1,2,...4. More speciﬁcally bloc 1 represents the European Free Trade Asso-
ciation(EFTA), bloc 2 the European Union (EU), bloc 3 the North American Free
Trade Association (NAFTA) and ﬁnally bloc 4 non bloc member countries.
sinh
−1(FDIi,s,t)=β0 + β1 ln(Yt)+β2 ln(Yi,t)+β3 ln(Nt) (6)
+β4 ln(Ni,t)+β5 ln(Di)+πnBlocn + εi,s,t
As can be seen in Table 5, estimates for variables of the basic regression are
a n a l o g o u st ot h eo n e so b t a i n e di nT a b l e3 ,e x c e p tt h a th e r ed i s t a n c ei si n s i g n i ﬁcant.
These results for distance may indicate that countries grouped in various trade blocs
tend to be geographically close to one another, the geographical ﬁxed diﬀerence is
captured primarily by these trade blocs so the distance variable is left insigniﬁcant.
Along these lines the insigniﬁcance of the non-bloc countries may be due to that
these are more geographically spread than others and therefore are not estimated
to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the EU bloc.
Moreover, the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates indicate that EFTA and NAFTA17 are
estimated to have signiﬁcantly higher investment in host than EU, but not the
fourth trade bloc (non-bloc members).
In general the ﬁxed bloc eﬀects may be related to predictions on investment costs
17The member countries of NAFTA are the US and Canada and they are presumed to be in
NAFTA from 1989, although NAFTA was not formed until in 1992. However, it is taken into
account whether other countries move between EFTA and EU etc.
19or openness by trade blocs. That is the reason why EFTA countries are estimated
to invest more in Iceland when compared to EU, could be because there is less
trade costs involved for them. However, based on the EEA (European Economic
Area) agreement EU countries have full permission to invest in EFTA countries
like Iceland. This freedom to invest must overcome some threshold investment
cost, and increase dual openness, but apparently there is some ﬁxed diﬀerence left.
Another possibility is that Switzerland which is in the EFTA group has substantial
investment in the power intensive industry.
Table 5. Fixed Trade Bloc Eﬀects
Regressors ihs robust
ln(Yt) Host Country GDP 2.189∗∗
(2.37)
ln(Yi,t) Source Country GDP 1.053∗∗∗
(5.36)
ln(Nt) Host Country Population −2.127
(−0.82)














Degrees of Freedom 8
R-Squared 0.1349
Note: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below the coeﬃcients. ***,
** and * denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
The log-likelihood measure presented in Table 5 has a value of -1111.6027 which
20is not signiﬁcantly better than that found in Table 318.
7.2 FDI Decomposition by Countries of Origin
In order to continue along the same lines, my next regression focuses more speciﬁ-
cally on the sources of FDI, by analyzing country decomposition. Thus, the next
step is to estimate whether a ﬁxed diﬀerence is identiﬁable between source coun-
tries of investment. Equation (7) therefore includes countries of origin, rather than
focusing on trade bloc membership like in Equation (6) before.
sinh
−1(FDIi,s,t)=β0 + β1 ln(Yt)+β2 ln(Yi,t)+β3 ln(Nt) (7)
+β4 ln(Ni,t)+θiCountryi + εi,s,t
Now the ﬁxed country is Denmark. Here the dummy variable is presented as
θi, and i runs by the source countries of investment, from θ1 to θ17. The regression
results are presented in Table 6. Estimates for distance cannot be included in the
equation, because it is ﬁxed over time.
Overall the estimates for market size and wealth are somewhat diﬀerent from
the basic gravity model speciﬁcation presented in Table 3, however it is not fully
comparable to Table 3 since it does not include distance as one of its variables. For
the same reason it cannot be regarded as a constrained version of the speciﬁcation
in Table 6, since Table 6 does not include distance.
As before, the wealth and market size eﬀects obtained for GDPs and population
in Table 6 indicate that the wealth tends to have positive eﬀects on FDI. Now
however, the estimates indicate that FDI is more driven by the wealth of the host
country than the wealth of the source country, since only host is estimated to be
signiﬁcant although both are estimated to be positive. And now source country
population is estimated to have positive eﬀects on FDI, implying that when correct-
ing for individual countries FDI is positively impacted by their market size, however
18Like before, the log-likelihood diﬀerence doubled is compared to a critical value from the chi-
squared distribution. And if the critical value is lower than the double diﬀerence, then hypothesis
imposing restriction is rejected as being more favourable than the unrestricted one.
21not signiﬁcantly.
As can be seen in Table 6, investment made by most of the 17 countries in
the Table is estimated to have a non-diﬀe r e n ti n v e s t m e n ta m o u n tf r o mt h eﬁxed
country, Denmark. Three countries are estimated to invest signiﬁcantly less than
Denmark however, and these are Austria, Belgium and Finland.
The log-likelihood value obtained for Table 6 has a value of -1050.27 which is
considerable less negative than the log-likelihood value obtained for the restricted
speciﬁcation presented in Table 3. However, Table 6 regressions results cannot be
compared to other tables in the remaining of the paper, and hardly to Table 3,
since distance is not included in Table 6. Overall, therefore, the results seem to
vary somewhat depending on whether corrected for country or trade bloc eﬀects.
22Table 6. Fixed Country Eﬀects
Regressors ihs robust
ln(Yt) Host Country GDP 2.416∗∗
(2.16)
ln(Yi,t) Source Country GDP 0.210
(0.13)
ln(Nt) Host Country Population −5.581∗
(−1.68)






































Degrees of Freedom 20
R-Squared 0.2671
Note: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below the coeﬃcients. ***, ** and *
denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
238 Sources and Allocation of FDI
8.1 Fixed Sector and Trade Bloc Eﬀects Determined
I now proceed by simultaneously taking into account sources and allocation of FDI.
The analysis will start by providing decomposition of investment into the main
investment sectors and country membership into various trade blocs. This is done
for the purpose of determining whether it is possible to determine ﬁxed diﬀerence
between individual sectors on one hand, and individual trade blocs on the other
hand. These eﬀects will be estimated simultaneously. I start by looking at the least
restricted version of the equation, after looking at the basic speciﬁcation including
the variables most commonly used in the gravity model. The results for estimating
Equation (8) are presented in Table 7.
sinh
−1(FDI i,s,t)=β0 + β1 ln(Yt)+β2 ln(Yi,t)+β3 ln(Nt)+β4 ln(Ni,t) (8)
+β5 ln(Di)+γkSectork + πnBlocn + εi,s,t
In Equation (8) the ﬁxed eﬀects technique is applied once more. The sector
dummy Sectork runs over sectors where k =1 ,2,...4. However, the bloc dummy
Blocn, runs over trade blocs where n=1,2,...4. The ﬁxed term can therefore be
presented as being β0 + γk + πn and the error term as being εi,s,t.H e r e πn is a
constant, accounting for trade bloc speciﬁce ﬀects as before, Sectork is a constant
accounting for sector speciﬁce ﬀects, and εi,s,t randomly distributed. There are
three possibilities available when the results for Equation (8) are analyzed. First it
is possible to set β0 =0and πn =0 , and second to set β0 =0and γk =0 . Thirdly,
it is possible to set πn =0and γk =0 . H e r ei ti sp r e s u m e dt h a tγ3 =0(coeﬃcient
for T&T sector) and π2 =0(EU bloc). Therefore the regression results obtained
for the dummy variables combined can be interpreted as the ”deviation” from the
T&T sector and the EU bloc.
Taken together, the results in Table 7 indicate that both the host and source
countries total wealth (measured as GDPs) are estimated to have signiﬁcant and
24positive eﬀects on FDI. However, the population variables continue to have signs
diﬀerent from what is typically found, with the source country population having
as i g n i ﬁcant value.
When both sector and bloc ﬁxed eﬀects are included simultaneously, the sector
dummy captures diﬀerence between that sector and T&T regardless of bloc. Simi-
l a r l y ,t h eb l o cc o e ﬃcient indicates the average of FDI from a bloc across all sectors.
The sector eﬀects estimates indicate that all the sectors are estimated to have a
signiﬁcantly higher share of FDI than the Telecom & Transport sector. Moreover,
when keeping the EU trade bloc ﬁxed, the EFTA and NAFTA blocs are estimated
to be positively and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the EU.
25Table 7. Fixed Sector and Trade Bloc Eﬀects
Regressors ihs robust
ln(Yt) Host Country GDP 2.189∗∗
(2.44)
ln(Yi,t) Source Country GDP 1.053∗∗∗
(5.54)
ln(Nt) Host Country Population −2.127
(−0.84)






Sector2 Comm. and Fin. Ind. 0.649∗∗∗
(6.58)












Degrees of Freedom 11
R-Squared 0.1814
Note: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below the coeﬃcients. ***,
** and * denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
One of the interesting things about the results in Table 7 is that the distance
variable is estimated to be insigniﬁcant, although negative as in all previous re-
gressions except for the Table 5 estimates. What is common with the regression
in Tables 5 and 7 is that both of these incorporate sector speciﬁce ﬀects. Taken
together the results for Tables 5 and 7 therefore indicate that the distance to mem-
ber countries of individual trade blocs are similar within each bloc and therefore
26accounted largely for by ﬁxed trade bloc eﬀects.
A comparison of the R-squared value in Table 7 to that in Table 3 indicates
that the regression applied in Table 3 does marginally better in explaining the
data. Comparisons of log-likelihoods yields a similar story. However, as before,
the log-likelihood ratio tests ﬁnds that this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant.
279C o n c l u s i o n
The main objective of this paper is to analyze whether the low foreign direct in-
vestment FDI can be explained by the gravity model, by means of market sizes and
distance. The results indicate that FDI is negatively aﬀected by distance, and gen-
erally negatively aﬀe c t e dp o p u l a t i o no ft h eh o s ta n ds o u r c ec o u n t r y ,b u tp o s i t i v e l y
aﬀected by their gross domestic products (GDPs). Taken together, these opposite
signs estimates for GDPs and population indicate that FDI is possibly aﬀected by
distance and wealth, rather than market size.
Estimation of sector speciﬁce ﬀects indicates that when corrected for distance,
as well as wealth and market size, multinationals have higher incentive to invest
in the ”power intensive” sector, the ”commerce and ﬁnance” sector and the ”other
industries” sector relative to the ”Telecom and transport” sector. Furthermore,
when compared to the EU trade bloc member countries, member countries of EFTA
and NAFTA are estimated to be more interested in investing in Iceland. However,
countries outside of trade blocs (non member countries) are estimated to have less
incentive for investing in Iceland than the EU member countries. Finally, overall
country eﬀects estimates indicate that in most cases countries do not invest sig-
niﬁcantly less or more than the ﬁxed country Denmark. However out of the 17
source countries, 3 countries (Austria, Belgium and Finland) are estimated to invest
signiﬁcantly less than Denmark, when corrected for market sizes.
An interesting topic for future research would be to analyze how foreign direct
investment in Iceland is aﬀected by factor endowments such knowledge capital, in
order to better explain the driving forces of FDI and more closely determine whether
FDI tends to be vertical rather than horizontal in nature.
28Appendix A.
This appendix exhibits several variants of the gravity model speciﬁcation, based
on whether the dependent variable is presented in natural logarithms, or as sub-
ject to the hyperbolic sine function. Moreover, the results from taking clustering
observations are also taken into account. The clusters are formed based on sectors.
The regression results in the ﬁf t hc o l u m ni nT a b l e8a r ed e r i v e df r o m( t i m e
series) data running over countries and years, not sectors like before. When these
are estimated they provide results consistent with the ihs results in column three.
Therefore, these results back up results for the basic ihs regression.
Table 8. Various Regressions of the Basic Speciﬁcation







































































Obs 740 740 740 239 185
R-Sq 0.1028 0.1028 0.1028 0.1373 0.3710
Clust 68
LL -1125.1015 -1125.1015 -539.22888 -320.5548
DoF 5555
Note: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below the coeﬃcients. ***, ** and *
denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
2910 Appendix B. Investment Deﬁnitions.
Here are some investment deﬁnitions by the World Bank, IMF and the OECD.
”Foreign direct investment (FDI) i sn e td i r e c ti n v e s t m e n tt h a ti sm a d et o
acquire a lasting management interest (usually 10 percent of voting stock) in an
enterprise operating in a country other than that of the investor (deﬁned according
to residency). The investor’s purpose is to be an eﬀective voice in the management
of the enterprise. FDI is the sum of net equity capital, net reinvestment of earnings,
net other long-term capital, and net short-term capital as shown in the balance of
payments” (World Bank, 2001, CD-ROM).
”Direct investment is the category of international investment that reﬂects
the objective of a resident entity in one economy (direct investor) of establishing a
lasting interest in an enterprise (the direct investment enterprise) resident in another
economy. ”Lasting interest” implies the existence of a long-term relationship and
as i g n i ﬁcant degree of inﬂuence by the direct investor on the management of the
direct investment enterprise. Direct investment involves both the initial transaction
between the two entities and all subsequent capital transactions between them and
among aﬃliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated” (Falizoni, 2000,
p. 4).
”A direct investor is deﬁned as an individual, an incorporated or unincorpo-
rated public or private enterprise, a government, a group of related individuals, or
a group of related incorporated and/or incorporated enterprises which have a direct
investment enterprise that is, a subsidiary, associate or a branch, operating in a
country other than the country or countries of residence of the direct investor(s)”
(Falizoni, 2000, p. 4).
”A direct investment enterprise is deﬁn e da sa ni n c o r p o r a t e do ru n i n c o r -
porated enterprise in which a foreign investor owns 10% or more of the ordinary
shares or voting power of an incorporated enterprise or the equivalent of an unin-
30corporated enterprise. Ownership of 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares or
voting stock is the guideline for determining the existence of a direct investment
relationship. An ”eﬀective voice in the management”, as evidenced by at least
10 percent ownership, implies that a direct investor is able to inﬂuence, or partic-
ipate in, the management of an enterprise; absolute control by a foreign investor
is not required. Direct investment enterprises may be subsidiaries, associates and
branches” (Falizoni, 2000, p. 4).
”Foreign direct investment ﬂows a r em a d eo ft h r e eb a s i cc o m p o n e n t s :
- equity capital: comprising equity in branches, all shares in subsidiaries and
associates (except non-participating, preferred shares that are treated as debt se-
curities and are included under other direct investment capital) and other capital
c o n t r i b u t i o n ss u c ha sp r o v i s i o n so fm a c h i n e r ye t c . . .
- reinvested earnings: consisting of the direct investors’s share (in proportion to
direct equity participation) of earnings not distributed, as dividends by subsidiaries
or associates and earnings of branches not remitted to the direct investor.
-other direct investment capital (or inter company debt transactions): covering
the borrowing and lending of funds, including debt securities and trade credits,
between direct investors and direct investment enterprises and between two direct
investment enterprises that share the same direct investor” (Falizoni, 2000, p. 4-5).
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